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International Disclosure Requirements 
Rohan Maitra* 
Abstract: Recent cases of corporate accounting fraud in China have presented 
countries attempting to prosecute these cases with legal difficulty. When non-
Chinese regulators have requested financial documents from the auditors of 
these accused companies for investigatory purposes, the auditors have refused 
to produce these documents, claiming that to do so would cause them to violate 
Chinese law. In response, regulators in multiple countries have sued these 
auditors to try and force them to produce the documents, and also threatened 
Chinese companies operating in their jurisdictions with delisting and other 
sanctions. This has resulted in a counterproductive stalemate in which there 
exists no clear set of guidelines for foreign regulators or accounting firms to 
follow in obtaining necessary information for prosecution and rectification of 
corporate fraud. This Note will argue that it is in the Chinese government’s best 
interests to formalize a process that satisfies the needs of both Chinese and 
foreign regulators without trapping accounting firms in the middle. This Note 
will also analyze the current state of cases regarding this issue and the potential 
consequences of a failure to resolve the issue. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
As the global economy becomes increasingly interconnected and large 
numbers of companies begin operating in multiple countries, governments 
have endeavored to properly regulate the global giants.1 As companies 
expand past their own borders and set up shop in jurisdictions with 
completely different systems, however, their presence and operations may 
occasionally cause conflicts when they try to follow both sets of rules.  
When these companies are suspected of committing crimes in their new 
places of business, methods of resolving these crimes are not always 
cordial, and may raise relevant questions. For instance, who has jurisdiction 
over the parties? Where should the lawsuit be filed?  If the result is positive, 
will it be necessary for the courts of a different country to enforce it? Will 
they, in fact, enforce any such order? 
One major issue that is causing a great deal of consternation in 
multiple jurisdictions is financial fraud by Chinese companies, which 
involves false statements made to their auditors, fake revenue, and other 
practices that allow the companies to obtain listings on foreign stock 
 
 1  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Regulating Multinational Corporations: Towards Principles Of Cross-Border 
Legal Frameworks in a Globalized World Balancing Rights With Responsibilities, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 451 (2008). 
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exchanges despite their comparatively poor financial statuses.2  
In recent years, Chinese auditors have come into conflict with the laws 
of multiple countries because of the Chinese government’s stance on the 
audited financial documents of these corporations.3 Regardless of whether 
the companies in question are listed on stock exchanges in foreign 
countries, Chinese law classifies these documents as “State Secrets.”4 Due 
to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Law Guarding State Secrets, 
which forbids the production of any document classified as a State Secret to 
a foreign entity, any firm ordered to produce these documents to a foreign 
regulator, no matter whether in the U.S. or any other country, finds itself in 
the undesirable position of violating either Chinese law or the law of the 
jurisdiction making the request.5 Consequently, when allegations of 
financial fraud or other wrongdoing are levied against these corporations, 
the accounting firms that perform audit and tax services for them—typically 
large accounting firms like those that comprise the Big Four—find 
themselves trapped between the proverbial “rock and a hard place.”6 Even 
more troubling for these firms is that governments around the world are 
also becoming less inclined to tolerate constant legal shielding of important 
corporate information. It keeps them from properly investigating companies 
who still wish to be listed on domestic exchanges, especially when these 
companies are faced with allegations of fraud and other notable 
wrongdoings.7 Courts around the world have begun expressing their 
displeasure with the status quo by no longer accepting the State Secrets 
defense.8 Instead, they have begun demanding that the Chinese auditors 
produce the audited materials in accordance with domestic law and have 
 
 2  Jake Lynch, To Control Fraud, De-Control Chinese Capital, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:56 
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324590904578289082162402440. 
 3  Chinese Audit Documents Remain out of Reach, THOMSON REUTERS TAX & ACCOUNTING NEWS 
(Oct. 26, 2013), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/media-resources/news-media-resources/checkpoint-
news/daily-newsstand/chinese-audit-documents-remain-out-of-reach/. 
 4  Under Articles 31 and 32, companies may face liability for divulging State Secrets without 
governmental approval. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa (中华
人民共和国保守国家秘密法) [Law of the People’s Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets] 
(promulgated by Order No. 6 of the President of the People’s Republic of China, 
Sep. 5, 1988, effective May 1, 1989), translated in ASIANLII, 
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/gssl248/. 
 5  Id. art. 26. 
 6  The Big Four accounting firms include Deloitte & Touche LLP, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
Ernst & Young LLP, and KPMG LLP. The Big Four Accounting Firms: Shape Shifters, THE 
ECONOMIST (Sep. 29, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21563726. 
 7  Nina Xiang, Accounting Fraud is Still Widespread Among Chinese Companies, FORBES ASIA 
(Apr. 16, 2014, 10:33 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ninaxiang/2014/04/16/accounting-fraud-is-
still-widespread-among-chinese-companies/. 
 8  One major example, discussed later in the paper, is Singapore’s refusal to accept a face-value 
allegation of a State Secrets violation. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd 
[2014] SGHC 155 (Sing.).  
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held that the Chinese auditors’ refusal to do so violates local law.9 The most 
significant of these rulings to date has been the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) initial finding that all four of the Big Four’s 
Chinese affiliates violated the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.10 The SEC’s decision 
resulted in a highly precarious standoff between the Chinese government 
and foreign regulators, with the auditors caught in the middle. 
Had the SEC ultimately implemented its ruling in the Initial Decision, 
which suspended the Chinese affiliates of the Big Four from practicing in 
front of the SEC for six months, it could have become a precedent resulting 
in hundreds of U.S.-listed Chinese companies losing their listing on U.S. 
stock exchanges. Furthermore, allowing the ruling to stand would also have 
caused a significant ripple effect—once the regulatory body in any major 
country demonstrates a willingness to endure a mass delisting of these 
companies, other jurisdictions might follow suit in the hopes of producing a 
favorable response from the Chinese government. In the case of the SEC, 
the agency chose instead to forego the sentence, effectively setting the 
problem up for a later resurgence, and leaving U.S. investors with virtually 
no more protections than they enjoyed prior to the lawsuit.11 In this 
geopolitical standoff, both these firms and the companies that perform audit 
services for the firms will find themselves caught in the middle, trying to 
comply with virtually incompatible requirements from entities with equally 
valid power to exercise jurisdiction over them. Auditors are effectively the 
battleground in this conflict, and may see adverse effects on their business 
and reputations before both sides reach a mutual understanding. Moreover, 
as more of these cases obtain standing in the courts of other countries, 
Chinese companies may have to deal with a growing stigma of 
inaccessibility. 
Part II of this Note will provide an in-depth look at the background of 
this conflict, track the evolution of the SEC’s lawsuit against the Chinese 
affiliates of the Big Four, carefully detail the solution that ended the 
Longtop Financial Technologies (Longtop) litigation, and discuss the 
possible negative consequences of allowing the issue to go unsolved. Part 
III will provide a more in-depth look at the State Secrets Law, and also look 
at the way other jurisdictions have begun to deal with this issue, 
highlighting the fact that this is not simply a China-U.S. spat. The Note will 
be focusing in particular on the way that each jurisdiction treats the 
accounting firms’ argument that Chinese audit work product must be 
classified as State Secrets. Part IV will summarize some of the 
consequences of not creating a viable long-term solution to the problem and 
 
 9  See id. 
 10  In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879, at *80 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 11   The SEC Caves on China, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2015, 11:12 AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-sec-caves-on-china-1424967173. 
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will also reference other areas of the law in which the State Secrets Law has 
begun to create problems for Chinese companies. Part V will conclude the 
Note by endorsing a legally binding formalization of the currently informal 
agreement that ultimately solved the Longtop issue. Under this solution, the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) will agree to allow 
requested documents to undergo review by Chinese regulatory authorities to 
redact state secrets prior to U.S. examination, and to keep any requested 
documents confidential. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), on the other hand, will agree to produce these documents to allow 
foreign regulators to determine whether or not fraud exists and will 
explicitly forbid Chinese auditors from hiding behind the State Secrets Law. 
This is a solution that requires concessions by both the Chinese government 
and the regulatory agencies that request access to the financial information 
of locally-listed Chinese companies. Moreover, it creates a viable, if 
cumbersome, compliance method for accounting firms and other entities to 
follow in fraud investigations that places them in no danger of violating 
either relevant country’s laws. 
 II. CHINESE BIG FOUR AFFILIATES, ACCOUNTING FRAUD, 
AND STATE SECRETS 
 A. The Origins of the Longtop Conflict 
The disclosure debacle originated with a simple discrepancy in the 
finances of Longtop Financial Technologies, a Cayman Islands company 
with its principal place of business in Hong Kong, China and Xiamen, 
China.12 Since 2007, Longtop was listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
and also engaged in a secondary offering in 2009.13 At first glance, 
Longtop’s business seemed innocuous enough—it provided information 
technology options to financial companies in China, and its customers 
seemed largely satisfied.14 By all accounts, Longtop’s efforts in this regard 
were highly successful. In fiscal year 2010, it posted profits and operating 
margins of 62.5% and 35.8% respectively, putting it far ahead of peer 
companies at the time.15 
Even with such consistently high profit margins in such a volatile 
market, however, few questioned details behind Longtop’s earnings, or 
their truthfulness. After all, implicitly affirming the veracity of these 
financial statements was the well-regarded reputation of Shanghai-based 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. (Deloitte), the Chinese arm of Big 
 
 12  In re Longtop Financial Tech. Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 561, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
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Four accounting firm Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu.16 Deloitte was Longtop’s 
outside auditor, providing audit services for Longtop’s Class Period 
financial statements.17 Deloitte also permitted Longtop to use its audit 
reports in its bid for registration with the SEC and allowed Longtop to 
incorporate its audit reports into documentation related to both its initial 
public offering and secondary offering.18 
In 2011, however, analysts closely watching the market began to 
question Longtop’s somewhat unbelievable roll of gains, pointing out that a 
company with “six times more cash than Microsoft” had relatively little to 
gain from a secondary offering.19 
The speculation caused Longtop’s shares to tumble.20 In an effort to 
mitigate its losses, Longtop used Deloitte’s reputation as a shield, calling a 
press conference to address the allegations and repeatedly referencing 
Longtop’s clean bill of financial health from Deloitte.21 
During this time, however, Deloitte also joined the crowd evincing 
suspicion of Longtop’s numbers. In order to complete Longtop’s 2011 
audit, Deloitte visited a number of Longtop’s banks to cross-check the 
information provided by its client.22 In following up with the banks, 
Deloitte discovered serious discrepancies between Longtop’s reported 
information and the bank records, including falsified financial statements, 
off-the-record transactions, and bank loans undisclosed in its audit reports.23 
Simply put, Deloitte found evidence of Longtop’s willful misrepresentation 
of its financial statements. 
In addition to the alarming discrepancies, Deloitte began to detect 
disturbing hints that Longtop’s representatives were stalling and trying to 
prevent Deloitte from getting the information necessary for a proper audit 
and the resolution of the financial issues.24 From calls to banks “asserting 
that [Deloitte] was not their auditor” to demands to Deloitte to relinquish 
audit work product to them, Longtop’s behavior raised Deloitte’s hackles.25 
In one particularly harrowing incident, Deloitte alleged Longtop employees 
threatened on-site Deloitte personnel that they would not be allowed to 
leave the premises unless they relinquished their audit review materials.26 
The simmering status quo finally reached a boiling point when 
Longtop Chairman Ka Xiao Gong called Deloitte Regional Managing 
 
 16  Id. 
 17  Id. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. at 568. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  Id. at 569. 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  Id. 
 26  Id. 
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Partner Paul Siu and informed him that the discrepancies were caused by 
Longtop’s adding of “fake revenues” to its books, and that even “senior 
management,” was involved in its fake recordings.27 Deloitte subsequently 
publicized a Letter of Resignation as Longtop’s auditor on May 19, 2011.28   
After Deloitte decided to publish the letter, however, the SEC 
subpoenaed all of Deloitte’s work product to further its investigation of the 
fraud allegations against Longtop.29 Since Deloitte LLP in the United States 
had performed audit review work for some of Longtop’s periodic reports, 
the company did not have any difficulty producing these documents.30  
However, the agency and the firm butted heads for the first time when the 
SEC demanded that Deloitte produce its Chinese audit work product for 
inspection “pursuant to Section 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”), as amended by Section 929J of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.”31 
In what would become the common refrain of Chinese accounting 
firms, Deloitte pronounced the SEC’s request unenforceable. Producing the 
Chinese audit work product, Deloitte claimed, would cause the firm to 
violate Chinese law, and potentially open Deloitte up to sanctions from the 
PRC government.32 Deloitte ultimately refused to produce the requested 
documents to the SEC.33 On May 9, 2012, the SEC formally initiated 
proceedings against Deloitte for willfully refusing to provide the audit 
papers in violation of § 106 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.34 
During the administrative proceedings, the SEC also chose to pursue 
the documents through federal court by bringing an action in the District of 
Columbia ordering Deloitte to “show cause” for why the firm “should not 
be ordered to comply with [the SEC’s] administrative subpoena.”35 Relying 
on the same arguments, Deloitte contended that it had not “willfully 
refused” to produce the documents because the SEC’s request was 
unenforceable under PRC law.36 Deloitte further argued that because the 
 
 27  Id. at 570. 
 28  Id. at 569; See also Letter from Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., to Mr. Thomas Gurnee, 
Chairman of the Audit Committee, Longtop Financial Technologies Ltd. (May 22, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1412494/ 000095012311052882/d82501exv99w2.htm.  
 29  Complaint, SEC v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., 2011 WL 12485523 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 
2011) (No. 11-512), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp-pr2011-180.pdf.  
 30  Id. 
 31  In re Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 66948, 2012 WL 1612081 
(May 9, 2012). 
 32  Peter Henning, Deloitte’s Quandary: Defy the SEC or China, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 20, 
2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/deloittes-quandary-defy-the-s-e-c-or-china/. 
 33  Id. 
 34  In re Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., Exchange Act Release No. 66948, 2012 WL 1612081 
(May 9, 2012). 
 35  U.S. S.E.C. v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA Ltd., 928 F. Supp. 2d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2013). 
 36  Id. at 45. 
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action was substantially similar to the SEC administrative proceeding, the 
lawsuit should be stayed until the SEC decided whether to pursue the 
litigation against Deloitte in federal court.37 Judge Deborah Ann Robinson 
of the District of Columbia District Court did not agree, holding that the 
stay Deloitte proposed would be too indefinite and would not promote the 
judicial efficiency that was the purpose of stays of that nature.38 
 B. The Longtop Resolution 
At this point, a twist occurred in the case. Instead of continuing to 
pursue the matter solely through SEC administrative law, the SEC and the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the U.S. 
accounting regulator with which Deloitte is registered in the United States, 
began negotiations with the CSRC, China’s securities regulator, to try and 
convince the agency to turn over Deloitte’s Longtop audit work product 
independently.39 
Although these efforts failed during 2012, they succeeded eventually. 
In 2013, the SEC and PCAOB reached a deal with the CSRC in which the 
CSRC would produce for the latter more than 200,000 pages of audit work 
product relating to Longtop.40 The deal, however, notably excluded any 
mention of China’s ability to consider audit work product as state secrets 
and included no admissions of error on the CSRC’s part.41 In short, China 
never actually surrendered jurisdiction of the documents even as it turned 
over all of the requested audit work product to the SEC.42 
Ironically, just a few days after the SEC released its high-impact Initial 
Decision on the consolidated case against the Big Four firms, the regulatory 
agency released a decision to drop the Longtop charges against Deloitte.43 It 
mattered little, however; by then, the SEC had already begun its five-
pronged attack against the State Secrets Law. 
 C. The Expansion of the Lawsuit and the Initial Decision 
As the administrative proceedings against Deloitte continued through 
2012 with no clear end in sight, the problem that caused those 
 
 37  Id. at 48. 
 38  Id. at 51. 
 39  Michael Rapoport & Dinny McMahon, China to Hand Over Audit Documents, WALL ST. J. (July 
11, 2013, 10:44 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887324425204578600582169764600. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Rapoport & McMahon, supra note 39.  
 42  See id. 
 43  Raymond Doherty, SEC drops Deloitte China case, ECONOMIA (Jan. 28, 2014), 
http://economia.icaew.com/news/january-2014/sec-drops-deloitte-china-case. 
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proceedings—financial fraud—began to appear more frequently and 
seriously damaged Chinese corporations’ credibility with the SEC.44 The 
agency identified at least nine more U.S.-listed Chinese companies dealing 
with allegations of financial fraud, and the SEC gradually became aware 
that Longtop’s financial practices could not be considered an isolated 
phenomenon in China.45 In order to facilitate SEC investigations into these 
nine corporations and perhaps to determine just how many U.S.-listed 
Chinese companies were practicing this kind of financial statement 
manipulation, the SEC initiated administrative proceedings against no fewer 
than five of China’s largest accounting firms, including all of the Big Four’s 
Chinese affiliates – Ernst & Young Hua Ming (EYHM), Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu CPA Ltd. (Deloitte), PricewaterhouseCoopers Zhong Tian (PwC, 
BDO Dahua CPA (Dahua), and KPMG Huazhen.46 
All of the accounting firms filed separate defenses, but all of their 
arguments shared at least one major common denominator: that the 
production of the requested documents would cause them to violate Chinese 
law and were therefore unenforceable.47 Two of the firms, however, came 
up with another argument rationalizing how production would put them in 
violation of Chinese law.48 Dahua and PwC argued that in addition to the 
Law Guarding State Secrets, the SEC’s demand for production would also 
force it to violate the equally restrictive Archives Law.49 
The SEC was largely unsympathetic to these arguments. In January 
2014, SEC administrative judge Cameron Elliott issued a one-hundred-plus 
page opinion suspending the right of the Chinese affiliates of the U.S.-based 
to practice before the commission for six months.50 Ultimately, only Dahua 
CPA Co., having already withdrawn from the U.S. issuers market, escaped 
the practice ban since the court saw no reason to ban the firm in an area 
 
 44  Zigan Wang, US-Listed Chinese Firm in Credibility Crisis: Who are They? Where are They? 
(Columbia Univ., Working Paper, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2177450.  
 45  Id. 
 46  Daniel O’Connor, Kim Nebirow & Paul Boltz Jr., SEC’s Charges Against Chinese Affiliates of 
U.S.-Based Accounting Firms Have Broad Implications, ROPES & GRAY LLP (Apr. 15, 2013), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/alerts/2012/12/secs-charges-against-china-based-accounting-
firms-have-broad-implications.ashx. 
 47  Respondent Dahua CPA Co.’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116; 
Respondent KPMG Huazhen’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872, 3-
15116; Respondent PwC Shanghai’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-
14872,3-15116; Respondent Ernst & Young Hua Ming’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding 
File No. 3-15116; Respondent Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA’s Prehearing Brief at 5, SEC Admin. 
Proceeding File Nos.  3-14872, 3-15116. 
 48  Respondent Dahua CPA Co.’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116; 
Respondent PwC Shanghai’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872,3-15116. 
 49  Respondent Dahua CPA Co.’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116; 
Respondent PwC Shanghai’s Prehearing Brief at 2, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872,3-15116. 
 50  In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879, at *80 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
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from it had already withdrawn.51 
In response to the argument that the firms could not produce the audit 
work because of the Law Guarding State Secrets, the court held that the 
firms’ exposure to civil and criminal liability in the PRC was not a 
sufficient reason to free the firms from their production obligations.52 The 
court reasoned that when each firm individually registered with the SEC for 
the authority to provide these services, they knew of the risk that some of 
their clients might be accused of financial fraud and of their obligations in 
such situations.53 The court found that in effect, the firms deliberately 
commenced business in the United States with the knowledge that if they 
were called upon to comply with U.S. law, they would “necessarily fail to 
fully cooperate.”54 The court used pointed language in its assessment of the 
practice, finding that the firms demonstrated gall in place of good faith, and 
that they were willfully violating U.S. law.55 
Additionally, the court also disagreed with the firms’ contention that 
the proposed practice ban could result in severely negative consequences 
for all parties involved.56 Although the court conceded that the necessary 
switch to a smaller auditor might impose major costs on Chinese 
companies, the court could find no reasonable basis to quantify those 
costs.57 The court also opined that delisting was unlikely to be harmful for 
the individual companies in the long run, because the delisting would 
theoretically be the result of disciplinary action against the auditor rather 
than disciplinary action against the company itself.58 
 D. The SEC Steps Back 
Perhaps realizing that results of the Initial Decision could negatively 
impact parties without a direct relation to the case, the SEC ultimately 
chose to forego the implementation of the Initial Decision. Instead, the 
agency opted to settle with the Big 4.59 Under its Order, each Chinese arm 
of the Big 4 would ultimately pay $500,000, admit only to the facts set forth 
in the Order and be allowed to continue practicing before the SEC.60 In the 
Order, the SEC did signal an intention to revisit the issue in four years’ 
 
 51  Id. at *84. 
 52  Id. at *79. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at *80–81. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at *81. 
 58  Id. at *82. 
 59  In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Corrected Order On The Basis Of Offers Of 
Settlement Of Certain Respondents Implementing Settlement, 2014 WL 242879, at *80 (Feb. 6, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74217.pdf. 
 60  Id. 
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time, but the decision did not make clear what needed to happen in order to 
avoid a redux of the same issue.61 Although this was hardly an unexpected 
outcome,62 critics showed no hesitation in blasting the decision.63 They 
opined that the SEC was merely kicking the can down the road and possibly 
allowing all sorts of abuses to continue in the meantime. Critics also noted 
that the Chinese government had effectively called the SEC’s bluff, and the 
“upshot [was] that investors in U.S. capital markets still lack basic 
protections against Chinese fraudsters.”64 
 III. THE STATE SECRETS LAW IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 A. The Confidentiality Protections: The State Secrets Law 
The PRC’s Law Guarding State Secrets very broadly defines state 
secrets, encompassing national interests and state security, as well as a large 
rubric of other categories including financial information.65 According to 
Article 10: 
[The] specific scopes and categories of state secrets shall be 
stipulated by the State Secret Guarding Department together with the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Public Security and State Security and 
other central organs concerned. The specific scopes and categories of 
state secrets related to national defense shall be stipulated by the 
Central Military Commission. Stipulations on the specific scopes and 
categories of state secrets shall be made known within relevant 
quarters.66 
Regardless of other passages in the law that create categories for state 
secrets, the above passage essentially provides the Chinese government 
with the power to classify anything as a state secret and refuse to produce it 
to a foreign entity. Under this broad scope, audit work product relating to 
 
 61  See id. 
 62  The SEC Shouldn’t Forget that Beijing Always Wins, CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/china-on-wall-street-sec-csrc-showdown-big-four-auditors. 
 63  Paul Gillis, SEC Settles with China Big Four, China Accounting Blog (Feb. 7, 2015, 1:03 PM), 
http://www.chinaaccountingblog.com/weblog/secsettleswithchinabig.html. 
 64   See The SEC Caves on China, supra note 11. 
 65  The Law Guarding State Secrets in China has generally been interpreted in a broad variety of 
ways, and encompasses a broad rubric of documents. Since the documents must be under the jurisdiction 
of the United States, however, this creates controversy. See generally Chang, Deconstructing the Audit 
Controversy, 32 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 28 (2013); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa 
Shishi Banfa (中华人民共和国保守国家秘密法实施办法) [Measures for Implementing the Law on the 
Protection of State Secrets of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l Admin. for the 
Protection of State Secrets, May 25, 1990), 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgl/swdcglgg/xgfg/t20041118_402209 111.htm. 
 66  See supra note 10, art. 10. 
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U.S.-listed Chinese firms, particularly those firms that do business with 
Chinese state-owned entities, qualify as state secrets.67 Major concerns over 
citing or even dealing with the Law Guarding State Secrets include the 
highly relevant fact that, as of yet, there exists no public basis for 
determining what constitutes a state secret leading critics to contend that the 
designation is arbitrary and granted at whim rather than through a 
consistently applied system.68 
 B. China’s Incentives to Preempt Further Problems 
Despite the SEC’s ultimate decision to avoid the “parade of horribles” 
that the Initial Decision might have unleashed, the ruling’s harsh language 
nonetheless created shockwaves that still might produce a significant effect. 
Since the filing of the SEC case in December 2012, structural changes of 
varying significance have already taken place within the accounting world. 
For instance, Dahua CPA, one of the defendants in the SEC case, chose to 
end its longtime affiliation with accounting power player BDO International 
in April, 2013, likely as a direct result of the case.69 BDO Dahua was named 
as a party in the case as a result of the aforementioned expansion of the 
case, and Dahua itself has withdrawn from the U.S. market as a result.70  
The Initial Decision also seems to have sparked a flicker of defiance 
from other courts as well, particularly those in Singapore and Hong Kong.  
While neither of these courts suggested anything as draconian as a practice 
ban for the auditors, both refused to accept at face value the contention that 
the auditors would violate Chinese law through production, and have 
berated the respective accounting firms for not producing any direct 
evidence supporting this argument.71 Regardless, it is clear that the State 
Secrets Law is causing problems in several jurisdictions of significant 
financial importance. 
In August 2014, PricewaterhouseCoopers Shanghai (PwC) lost a 
similar case in Singapore’s High Court having refused to produce audit 
work papers relevant to Singapore-listed Celestial Nutrifoods’ bankruptcy 
 
 67  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Baoshou Guojia Mimi Fa Shishi Banfa (中华
人民共和国保守国家秘密法实施办法) [Measures for Implementing the Law on the Protection of State 
Secrets of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Nat’l Admin. for the Protection of State 
Secrets, May 25, 1990), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgl/swdcglgg/xgfg/t20041118_402209 111.htm. 
 68  Richard J. Silk, China’s Secret Anti-Secrecy Act, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME BLOG (Feb. 3, 
2014, 9:36 PM), contending that every step toward openness in the Chinese system runs up against a 
barrier of vague legal definitions that stymie the purpose of the steps themselves, since no one can know 
beyond a reasonable doubt what can and cannot be made public. 
 69   In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879, at *28 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 70   Id. at *1. 
 71  BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd [2014] SGHC 155 (Sing.). 
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and assets in China.72 In this case, instead of fraud allegations, the conflict 
came about as a result of the liquidation of Celestial Nutrifoods 
(Celestial).73 Similar to Longtop, Celestial maintained a fairly complex 
legal connection to the PRC.74 Celestial, an investment holding company 
incorporated in Bermuda in 2003, whose main business was producing 
soybean protein-based foods, owned a number of subsidiaries incorporated 
in the British Virgin Islands that in turn owned subsidiaries incorporated in 
the PRC.75  
In spite of this complicated business structure, the company carried out 
its main operations in China, and it obtained listing status on the Singapore 
Stock Exchange in 2004.76 In 2006, the company issued bonds to investors 
with a put option that allowed them to redeem the bonds at more than 100% 
of their face value.77  When the global financial crisis struck two years later, 
a large number of investors chose to exercise this option in the same time 
period, and the company was unable to meet its subsequent financial 
obligations.78 As a result, the plaintiff, who was the trustee of those bonds, 
commenced winding up proceedings and appointed a provisional liquidator 
to oversee the process.79  
Upon commencing the process, the liquidator discovered that the 
company’s main operations and senior management were based in China 
and reached out to them for assistance with the winding up process.80 In 
addition to finding the Chinese management branch unresponsive, the 
liquidator also found evidence that the company’s assets were being moved 
around “in a series of suspicious transactions,” which led him to believe 
that Celestial’s investors owned shares in a “worthless company whose 
assets had been stripped away.”81 Still unable to prompt any kind of 
response from the PRC arm of the company, the liquidator filed suit in 
Singapore in the hope of getting the answers he needed from Celestial’s 
auditor, which was PwC Shanghai.82 
According to Singapore law, when a company undertakes the 
liquidation process, the court is free to summon before it “any person whom 
the court considers capable of giving information concerning the 
 
 72  See PwC Loses Case on Producing China-Related Audit Papers in Singapore, CFO INNOVATION 
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://m.cfoinnovation.com/story/8760/pwc-loses-case-producing-china-related-audit-
papers-singapore 
 73  BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd [2014] SGHC 155 (Sing.).  
 74  Id. ¶ 4. 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. ¶ 5. 
 78  Id.  
 79  Id. ¶ 6. 
 80  Id. ¶ 7. 
 81  Id. 
 82  Id. 
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promotion, formation, trade dealings, affairs or property of the company.83  
When the liquidator summoned PwC Shanghai to court, PwC argued that 
producing the documents would expose the company to liability in the 
PRC.84 In particular, PwC argued through expert testimony that because the 
documents requested could contain evidence of loans or other transactions 
signed by local governments and correspondence with government officials, 
it was in fact very likely that the documents contained state secrets as 
classified under Chinese law.85 They further opined that if the documents 
did contain state secrets under Chinese law, the consequences for producing 
those documents to a foreign entity could be severe.86 
However, the court rejected this argument, pointing out that even if the 
Law Guarding State Secrets was applicable in this instance, PwC Shanghai 
simply had not provided any evidence that the documents did in fact 
contain state secrets.87 The court emphasized in particular that PwC 
Shanghai had not even provided the documents in question to its experts so 
that they could offer a more informed opinion than just generalizing about 
China’s expansive use of the law.88 In light of the lack of certainty in the 
defense, the court held that PwC Shanghai failed to provide sufficient 
evidence to free it from production obligations and ordered that PwC 
Shanghai produce the requested documents.89  
It is also worth noting that unlike the U.S. holding, the High Court in 
Singapore did not directly address whether Chinese law could actually 
provide sufficient reasons for refusal to produce the audit documents.90 
Instead, the court found that PwC Shanghai did not provide sufficient 
evidence that they could not produce the documents without violating 
Chinese law.91 This distinction leaves open the question of whether the 
result would have been different if PwC Shanghai had gone to more of an 
effort to provide evidence of state secrets existing in the documents.  
On April 8, 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the 
High Court, weighing in with substantially similar arguments to those 
offered by the High Court.92 As of now, the documents have been produced 
by branches of PwC based outside China. No Chinese entity has weighed in 
on the production of the documents, leaving the issue still unresolved.93 
 
 83  Id. ¶ 1. 
 84  Id. ¶¶ 51–52. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. ¶ 58. 
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. ¶ 82. 
 90  Id. ¶ 58. 
 91  Id. 
 92  Id. ¶¶ 63-65. 
 93  Id. 
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 C. Standard Water Limited in Hong Kong 
In another groundbreaking (and arguably the most significant to date) 
decision in May, 2014, a Hong Kong court ordered Big Four Chinese 
affiliate Ernst & Young Hong Kong (EYHM) to turn over its audit papers 
regarding Standard Water Limited, a Chinese water treatment company 
listed in Hong Kong.94 From a factual perspective, however, this case 
differs greatly from the other two. Similar to the case in Singapore, the 
difference may have allowed Hong Kong to sidestep a full answer to the 
Law Guarding State Secrets question.95  
Since 2009, Ernst & Young acted as Standard Water Limited’s auditor 
in China and performed field work for them. When the company applied for 
a listing on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2010, however, Ernst & 
Young also engaged the services of EYHM, its affiliate in Hong Kong. In 
mid-2010, Ernst & Young resigned from the auditorship of Standard Water 
Limited, citing the now-familiar reason of inconsistent statements in the 
company’s documents that made it impossible for Ernst & Young to 
properly perform its audit.96  
After the company withdrew its application for listing, the Securities 
Financial Commission in Hong Kong (SFC) began investigating the 
company for possible instances of fraud and noncompliance.97 In order to 
facilitate its investigation, the SFC requested that Ernst & Young submit a 
detailed explanation for its resignation and all of its work product for the 
client.98 Ernst & Young only offered limited compliance, claiming that the 
vast majority of the work performed for Standard Water Limited had been 
performed by its Mainland China affiliate, Ernst & Young Hua Ming.99 The 
Hong Kong auditor did not have the authority, or so it claimed, to exercise 
control over these documents in a manner that would allow for their 
 
 94  CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, HONG KONG COURT ORDERS ERNST AND YOUNG TO HAND OVER 




 95  Joan Hon, EY Appeals Hong Kong Court Order To Produce Audit Working Papers 
Notwithstanding Holding That EY ‘Deliberately Withheld From SFC’ and State Secrets Not at Issue, 
REED SMITH GLOBAL REGULATORY ENFORCEMENT LAW BLOG (July 2, 2014, 11:40 AM), 
http://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2014/07/articles/securities-litigation/ey-appeals-
hong-kong-court-order-to-produce-audit-working-papers.  
 96  See CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, supra note 94, at 5. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Peter So & Karen Dicks, Ernst & Young Ordered to Produce Accounting Records & Audit 
Papers to the SFC, DEACONS NEWSLETTER (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.deacons.com.hk/news-and-
insights/publications/ernst-and-young-ordered-to-produce-accounting-records-and-audit-papers-to-the-
sfc.html. 
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production to the SFC.100 As the case appeared to draw to a close, however, 
Ernst & Young produced a laptop with audit work product for Standard 
Water on its hard drive and claimed that the data had been brought to Hong 
Kong “by mistake.”101 Ernst & Young also produced two additional hard 
drives and a witness, a partner specializing in quality and risk management 
who claimed that he had no memory or personal knowledge whatsoever of 
the relevant facts in the case.102 
With the last-minute evidence and haphazard testimony, the Hong 
Kong Court of First Instance held that Ernst & Young had actively withheld 
relevant information from the court.103  The court further found that Ernst & 
Young’s relationship with EYHM in China was that of principal and agent, 
and that Ernst & Young did in fact have the authority to demand production 
of the documents from EYHM.104 Significantly, the court placed squarely 
on the auditor the burden of proving that the documents requested contained 
state secrets and other liability-creating content.105 
Unlike the case in the United States, however, the court in Hong Kong 
chose an approach similar to that of the Singapore High Court and avoided 
grappling directly with the question of whether the Law Guarding State 
Secrets extends to audit work product.106  Indeed, there was no reason to 
deal with these questions, since the party in question was a Hong Kong Big 
Four affiliate rather than the Chinese affiliate, which is Ernst & Young Hua 
Ming.107 Accordingly, the Hong Kong court declared the Chinese legal 
issues to be a large “red herring” in the case and did not engage in any in-
depth discussion of their implications.108 Instead, the court emphasized that 
the case concerned only the obligations of an audit firm practicing in Hong 
Kong, effectively sidestepping the State Secrets issue altogether.109 The 
case ultimately turned on whether Ernst & Young did in fact have the 
authority to produce the documents requested. It is worth noting that the 
court might not have been able to do this had Ernst & Young not been 
found to be withholding information without a reasonable basis for doing 
so.110  
In July 2015, the SFC announced that E&Y had decided to discontinue 
its appeal of the Court of First Instance’s Order, citing the already 
successful production of the accounting documents requested as the chief 
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Hon, supra note 95. 
 102 Id. 
 103 CLIFFORD CHANCE LLP, supra note 94, at 1–5. 
 104 See So & Dicks, supra note 99. 
 105 Hon, supra note 95. 
 106 See So & Dicks, supra note 99. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Hon, supra note 102. 
 109 Id.  
 110 See So & Dicks, supra note 99. 
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reason for the halt to proceedings.111 Observers were quick to point out that 
the decision offered no guidance for production of documents going 
forward and that several factors in the decisions rather heavily implied that 
both the SFC and EYHM were working with CSRC to produce those 
documents without violating the law.112 In the meantime, however, the 
Ministry of Finance in China published the “Interim Provisions on 
Accounting Firms’ Provision of Auditing Services for the Overseas Listing 
of Enterprises in Chinese Mainland,” almost as if in anticipation of 
EYHM’s decision to drop the appeal and produce the papers.113 The 
provisions only slightly resemble the haphazard and secrecy-filled Longtop 
solution, and firmly state that overseas accounting companies and Chinese 
companies listed abroad may not transfer the documents containing state 
secrets out of the country. The presence of relevant audit documents outside 
of Mainland China is the decisive factor that forced EYHM to produce 
those documents in Hong Kong, and PwC to produce the documents in 
Singapore.114 The provisions very conspicuously fail to mention what 
should be done in cases where documents containing state secrets are 
requested for production from the mainland, and the matter remains 
unsolved to this day. 
 D. Geopolitical Showdowns 
The above decision is key in a geopolitical sense because of the “one 
China, two systems” phenomenon, which means in practice that although 
Hong Kong is officially a province of the PRC, it follows a different system 
of rules composed of a mixture of its laws under the previous British system 
and PRC laws.115 As a result, residents of Hong Kong lead their lives 
 
 111 EY’s Appeal Over Audit Working Papers Discontinued, SECURITIES & FUTURES COMMISSION 
HONG KONG(July 23, 2015), https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/news-and-
announcements/news/doc?refNo=15PR79. 
 112 Enoch Yiu, Beijing’s State Secrets Law Will Lead To Further Legal Disputes Unless Procedures 
Are Clarified, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (July 28, 2015, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.scmp.com/print/business/china-business/article/1844099/sfc-wins-hong-kong-case-against-
ey-future-problems-loom. 
 113 Caizheng Bu Guanyu Yinfa Kuaijishi Shìwu Suo Congshi Zhongguo Neidi Qiye Jingwai 
Shangshì Shenjì Yewu Zhan Hang Guiding De Tongzhi (财政部关于印发《会计师事务
所从事中国内地企业境外上市审计业务暂行规定》的通知) [Notice of the Ministry of Finance on 
Issuing the Interim Provisions on Accounting Firms’ Provision of Auditing Services for the Overseas 
Listing of Enterprises in Chinese Mainland] (promulgated by Ministry of Fin. May 26, 2015), 
http://lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=19399&lib=law. 
 114 HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS LLP, INTRODUCTION OF NEW PRC REGULATIONS REITERATING 
RULES ON STATE SECRETS POST SFC V EY JUDGMENT (Sept. 25, 2015), 
http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/insights/legal-briefings/introduction-of-new-prc-regulations-
reiterating-rules-on-state-secrets-post-sfc-v-ey-judgment. 
 115 See William I. Friedman, China’s One Country, Two Systems Paradigm Extends Itself Beyond 
The Mainland’s Borders to the Southern Provincial Government Of Hong Kong, 11 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & 
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subject to a significantly different set of laws from those of their PRC 
“cousins,” especially with regard to technology.116 Indeed, the most 
prominent example lies in the fact that Hong Kong residents have for years 
been able to access blocked social media websites like Twitter and 
Facebook freely whereas those websites are blocked in the mainland.117  
Despite the differences, however, Hong Kong is still part of the PRC 
and should theoretically be subject to the Law Guarding State Secrets.118 
From a geopolitical perspective, this helps dispel the perception that this is 
simply another “China vs. the West” issue, and Singapore’s participation in 
this particular conflict also helps to emphasize the need for China to address 
this problem effectively and quickly. If even one of China’s provinces is 
beginning to run into difficulties with this law’s implementation, it 
behooves the Chinese government to provide clarification on these issues as 
soon as possible, instead of sidestepping them.119 
In every individual case involving production of audit work product, 
the accounting firm at issue has cited the Chinese Law Guarding State 
Secrets in its defense.120 Hong Kong did not directly address the issue.121 
Both the U.S. and Singapore have refused to accept this argument, although 
the latter left some leeway for the firms.122 All of these countries have 
different political and legal systems, and all have reached the conclusion 
that the State Secrets Law is no longer a viable shield for Chinese auditors 
to use in protecting information. These decisions are instrumental in setting 
up a largely political showdown with the PRC and trapping the accounting 
firms in the middle of what they claim is a largely political showdown that 
 
POL’Y 65 (2001). This paper describes how the life of the average citizen in Hong Kong is relatively 
unchanged after the British followed through on their agreement to relinquish control of the territory. 
 116 See id. 
 117 Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook in Hong Kong: Closer to China, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2011), 
http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2011/02/09/facebook-hong-kong-one-step-closer-to-china/.  
 118 Donna Wacker, High Court Set to Decide on State Secret Law’s Reach, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Sep. 19 , 2012, 12:42 PM) http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1040076/high-court-set-decide-
state-secrets-laws-reach, detailing the implications of allowing Mainland law to be applied in Hong 
Kong. 
 119 Donna Wacker, High Court Set to Decide on State Secret Law’s Reach, SOUTH CHINA MORNING 
POST (Sept. 19, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1040076/high-court-set-
decide-state-secrets-laws-reach. 
 120 Respondent Dahua CPA Co.’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116; 
Respondent KPMG Huazhen’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872, 3-15116; 
Respondent PwC Shanghai’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872,3-15116; 
Respondent Ernst & Young Hua Ming’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116; 
Respondent Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-
14872, 3-15116. 
 121  BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd [2014] SGHC 155 (Sing.); In 
the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879(ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 122 Id. ¶58. 
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they claim is best resolved by government-to-government negotiation 
instead of enforcement through the court system.123 
In the United States, the charged accounting firms have also cited the 
Chinese Archives Law in their defenses.124 For example, in the SEC case 
mentioned above, Dahua argued that its work cases should be considered 
archives under Chinese regulations.125 Similar to the Law Guarding State 
Secrets, the Archives Law provides a broad mantle of authority to Chinese 
regulators, requiring that the CSRC or governing body whose role is closest 
to the document in question provide approval for the production of all 
“archives” whose preservation is in the interest of the state to be delivered 
to a non-Chinese entity.126 Just as the nature of “state secrets” is undefined 
in the Law Guarding State Secrets, it is unclear from the text of the 
Archives Law what can be classified as an “archive.”127  
The SEC has rejected this argument, contending that the firms have 
provided no evidence that the documents could be considered archives or 
that their production would expose the firms to liability in the PRC.128 
 Again, under the definitions of both laws, audit work product may 
qualify for protection since the Chinese government has a vested interest in 
protecting Chinese companies’ financial information and might have a 
national security interest in protecting that of state-owned entities, which 
make a up a significant and increasingly important portion of China’s 
economy.129 
 
 123 O’Connor, Nebirow & Boltz Jr., supra note 46. 
 124 In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879(ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 125 In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879, at *4 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml; 
Respondent Dahua CPA Co.’s Prehearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-15116. 
 126 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dangan Fa (中华人民共和国档案法) [Archives Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1987, 
effective July 5, 1996), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=286&CGid=. Articles 
14 through 18 of the Law govern the transportation of archives, and require approval of government 
authorities, similar to the Law Guarding State Secrets. Article 24 discusses liability and sanctions for 
those who violate the law, which the Big Four might well do in producing audit work papers. 
 127 Id. 
 128 See Kathy Chu, SEC Probe Puts China Listings in Doubt, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323401904578158652523742958.html; In the Matter 
of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 242879, at *1 (ALJ 
Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 129 Richard J. Silk, China’s Secret Anti-Secrecy Act, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME BLOG (Feb. 3, 
2014, 9:36 PM), contending that every step toward openness in the Chinese system runs up against a 
barrier of vague legal definitions that stymie the purpose of the steps themselves, since no one can know 
beyond a reasonable doubt what can and cannot be made public. 
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 IV. CONSEQUENCES AND TIME LIMITS 
 A. The Potential Consequences of Inaction 
Conflicts between Chinese entities and U.S. companies are not a new 
phenomenon. The past two years alone have included allegations of theft 
and breach of contract against entities as prominent as Sinovel Wind Group 
Company, a formerly state-owned power player in China’s wind energy 
industry.130 Beyond that, China’s extensive state involvement has also 
conflicted with national security interests in other jurisdictions.131 This has 
caused some notable transaction cancellations, possibly because of 
suspicions of spying and scientific espionage.132 Most conflicts are limited 
to disputes between large players like Sinovel and American 
Superconductor Corporation (AMSC), but the State Secrets issue could 
have some rather large implications for both U.S. markets and Chinese 
companies both currently in the U.S. market and looking to access those 
markets in the future.133 Furthermore, it may have some severe implications 
for China-based accounting firms that may no longer be able to avoid 
violating the laws of multiple jurisdictions when, perhaps through no fault 
of their own, their clients are accused of securities fraud.134 Additionally, 
the SEC’s ruling could have severely limited Chinese companies’ overall 
access to U.S. capital markets, freezing them out of these markets. Without 
access to Chinese affiliates of the Big Four, large Chinese corporations 
would have been unable to find new auditors in time to file their periodic 
reports. When companies fail to file their periodic reports in a timely 
fashion, the penalty could include the loss of their public exchange 
listing.135 Without auditors with the prestige and trust of the Big Four, 
 
 130 Michael Riley, China’s Sinovel Charged with Stealing Trade Secrets, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jun. 
27, 2013, 10:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-27/china-s-sinovel-charged-with-
stealing-trade-secrets.html. In this case, AMSC accused Sinovel of corporate espionage and theft of 
trade secrets, and is currently pursuing the case through the Chinese legal system. An initial ruling 
favored AMSC, allowing them to avoid moving the case into arbitration. 
 131 In India, Huawei has been banned from bringing in locally made equipment. Juro Osawa, Why 
Huawei Will Stay in India, WALL ST. J. DIGITS BLOG (Feb. 7, 2014, 7:10 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/02/07/why-huawei-will-stay-in-india/. 
 132 Recently, China was found to be using somewhat reprehensible means to steal  
technology secrets from Japan. Julian Ryall, Chinese Hostesses Catch Japanese Hi-Tech Executives in 
Honey Trap, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Oct. 22, 2013), 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1336808/chinese-hostesses-catch-japanese-hi-tech-executives-
honey-trap. 
 133 See generally Respondents’ Posthearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos.  3-14872,3-
15116. This is the accounting firms’ first reaction to the practice bar, and they list out some significant, 
although probably exaggerated, consequences of not allowing the firms to audit U.S.-listed Chinese 
firms. 
 134 O’Connor, Nebirow & Boltz Jr., supra note 46. 
 135 See Kathy Chu, supra note 128; O’Connor, Nebirow & Boltz Jr., supra note 46; Respondent’s 
36_3_4_MAITRA FINAL.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 10/10/16  8:37 PM 
Scaling Two Great Walls 
36:587 (2016) 
607 
Chinese companies will have only limited options for U.S. filings.136 They 
will not be able to perform initial public offerings and navigate the 
requirements to raise capital in the United States.137 This result could 
seriously damage one of the largest cross-border trading relationships in the 
world and cause major setbacks for both Chinese companies and U.S. 
multinational corporations, who may wish to hire the Big Four in China as 
well.138 
 V. THE COMMON GROUND SOLUTION 
 A. Progress on Cross-Border Law: Areas of Compatibility 
Given the threat of a mass delisting of publicly listed Chinese 
companies in the U.S. exchanges, the Chinese government has not ignored 
the situation. The CSRC, for instance, has been negotiating multiple 
agreements that allow for production of the necessary documents on a case-
by-case basis.139 However, this process has yet to result in a single binding 
agreement between China and any other country on corporate information, 
and the case-by-case basis on which the CSRC has been proceeding is not a 
long-term solution to the problem. 
Also, Chinese legislators have been openly speculating about both 
reducing and defining the actual scope of State Secrets, which would go a 
long way toward providing the long-suffering audit firms with clear 
guidelines for production or refusal.140 The status of this proposal, however, 
is still completely uncertain. Furthermore, there exists no guarantee that the 
scope of the Law Guarding State Secrets will even be defined to include 
audit work product, let alone reduced to exclude audit work product.141 
Even under current Chinese law, however, a solution to this quandary 
exists. This solution involves the Chinese government finding common 
ground with the reasonable requests of foreign regulators who simply want 
to make sure that the firms applying for listing on domestic stock exchanges 
are being open and honest about their financial positions. If reasonably 
interpreted, the relevant Chinese laws may allow for production of the work 
papers for fraud-related investigative purposes, pending concessions from 
 
Posthearing Brief, SEC Admin. Proceeding File Nos. 3-14872, 3-15116. 
 136 See Kathy Chu, supra note 128. 
 137 See id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMMM’N, PUB. CO. ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BD., CIRCULAR ON 
ON-SITE REGULATION OF THE 2012 ANNUAL REPORTS OF LISTED COMPANIES (Dec. 27, 2013), 
http://pcaobus.org/International/Documents/MOU_China.pdf. 
 140 Hui Lu, China Exclusive: Lawmaker Proposes Reducing Scope of State Secrets, XINHUA (Oct. 
28, 2014), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-10/28/c_133749032.htm.  
 141 Id. 
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both foreign regulators and the Chinese government.142 For instance, at the 
end of the negotiation process, the CSRC ultimately decided to produce the 
requested Longtop documents after an exhaustive review process to 
determine whether or not the documents contained any state secrets. 
According to Section 106(b) of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, “If a foreign 
public accounting firm performs material services upon which a registered 
public accounting firm relies in the conduct of an audit or interim review, 
issues an audit report, performs audit work, or conducts interim reviews, the 
foreign public accounting firm shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of the United States for purposes of enforcement of any request for 
such documents.”143 Similarly, under Singaporean law, an extraterritorial 
authority applies. 
Under S 285 of the Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed), when a 
company is in liquidation, the court may summon before it any 
person whom the court considers capable of giving information 
concerning the promotion, formation, trade dealings, affairs or 
property of the company. Such person may be examined on oath 
regarding the aforesaid matters and the court may also require him to 
produce any books or papers in his custody or power relating to the 
company.144 
 In the latter half of the sentence lies the problem; one condition of the 
CSRC’s negotiation with the PCAOB is very firm and states that none of 
the relevant audit work product shall be used in any kind of litigation.145 
This means that the documents, produced or not, are not actually subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction.146 Given the magnitude of the negotiations, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that the CSRC would be similarly unwavering with 
regard to other jurisdictions. Chinese law, however, does allow for a 
solution to this issue. 
Articles 21-22 of the Law Guarding State Secrets allow for “state 
secrets” to be produced to a foreign party, provided that the foreign party is 
willing to reciprocate in kind and that the information produced is subject to 
nondisclosure requirements.147 This clause provides a solution that allows 
for the documents to be placed under foreign jurisdiction, and allows the 
 
 142 See generally Chang, supra note 65.  
 143 15 U.S.C.A. § 7216 (2012).  
 144 BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v Celestial Nutrifoods Ltd [2014] SGHC 155 (Sing.).  
 145 See generally Chang, supra note 65.  
 146 See id. 
 147 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Dangan Fa (中华人民共和国档案法) [Archives Law of the 
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 5, 1987, 
effective July 5, 1996), arts. 21–22, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=286&CGid=. Both articles offer general 
guidelines for the production of sensitive documents for foreign assessment. All documents containing 
state secrets must be approved for production by the Chinese government. 
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CSRC to point out which sections, if any should be redacted.148 In fact, the 
CSRC has signed a nonbinding Memorandum of Understanding with the 
PCAOB, the U.S. accounting industry’s chief regulator, noting that this is a 
possibility and outlining initial requirements for cooperation.149 Under these 
requirements, Chinese auditors will undergo a process under the jurisdiction 
of the CSRC by which certain items can be approved for production via 
declassification or determination that no state secrets exist in the relevant 
documents.150 As noted in Standard Water Limited in Hong Kong, there is 
no blanket ban on production of audit documents to foreign securities 
regulators, implying that there are circumstances in which production will 
be allowed.151 The actual procedure described in the MOU, however, is still 
very murky, and the inescapable conclusion upon reading it is that if a 
Chinese agency decides to declare that a document contains secrets and 
cannot be produced, a U.S. agency has no legal recourse to address this.152 
In spite of these drawbacks, some progress has been made toward this 
particular end already. In 2013, the Chinese government authorized 
production of audit documents for at least one company, which was 
Longtop Financial Technologies, to United States regulators.153 It is worth 
noting that the Memorandum, while a significant step forward, still contains 
cautionary language; it still specifies that these requests will not be 
enforceable in a situation “where the request would require the Requested 
Party to act in a manner that would violate domestic law.”154 The Law 
Guarding State Secrets is a domestic law in the PRC, as is the Archives 
Law and the other laws mandating that certain pieces of Chinese 
information be kept a secret. As such, these laws and their status may 
ultimately raise the same issue currently hampering the process. Under the 
vague standards for state secrets, the CSRC may refuse to turn over 
documents requested by regulators without providing an explicit reason for 
doing so, i.e. specifying the type of state secrets contained therein rather 
than a blanket citation of the law, similar to how PwC Shanghai lost 
Celestial Nutrifoods in Singapore.155 Furthermore, although the topic arose 
during the extensive negotiation process, the CSRC has still refused to 
allow PCAOB inspectors to enter Chinese soil and perform review services 
in the PRC.156 
 
 148 Id. 
 149 See CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMMM’N, supra note 139. 
 150 Id. 
 151 See So & Dicks, supra note 99. 
 152 See Memorandum of Understanding on Enforcement Cooperation, U.S.-China, May 7, 2013, 
https://pcaobus.org/International/Documents/MOU_China.pdf. 
 153 Rapoport & McMahon, supra note 39. 
 154 In the Matter of BDO, EY, KPMG, PwC, & DTTC, Initial Decision Release No. 553, 2014 WL 
242879, at *1 (ALJ Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/apdocuments/ap-3-15116.xml. 
 155 See CHINA SEC. REGULATORY COMMM’N, supra note 139, at 5. 
 156 Id. 
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Given this initial success of the Longtop result, however, the Chinese 
government has shown a willingness to negotiate and may be open to 
accepting a compromise that preserves its right to protect its state secrets 
while fulfilling the foreign regulators’ need for basic documentation to 
determine the veracity of fraud allegations.157 Under these circumstances, 
the U.S. regulatory authorities would be well advised to focus on 
formalizing the process that ultimately produced Longtop’s documents, and 
which is loosely detailed in the aforementioned Memorandum.158 Although 
this has not been repeated in any other instance, it nonetheless remains a 
process which at least temporarily satisfied both the PCAOB and the CSRC 
over a major issue.159 Formalizing it into a binding agreement would 
remove the need for the SEC’s ominous caveat that it might once again 
require the aid of the courts and remove the Big Four from their 
quandaries.160 
Even taking this into account, however, foreign regulators like the 
PCAOB can work within their own rules and can simultaneously avoid 
becoming overbearing in their demands for Chinese government 
information.161 For instance, in the United States, PCAOB rules do not 
explicitly state that the board must have the unrestricted right to inspect 
every aspect of a process that is truly the CSRC’s jurisdiction.162 In fact, 
PCAOB rules explicitly state that the board may rely on a foreign 
regulator’s work product for purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.163 So, 
what the PCAOB can do in order to resolve this situation is to slightly 
revise its demand that the documents be turned over with no strings 
attached and rely on the results of CSRC’s investigations and numbers to 
determine whether litigation is necessary.164 In practice, this replicates the 
exchange that occurred in the deal that finally produced the Longtop 
documents, but such a solution would also require some concessions for 
jurisdictional requirements on the CSRC’s part, which were not referenced 
in the Memorandum of Understanding. If the CSRC’s main concern is to 
preserve state secrets, it can do so either by redacting the state secrets in any 
given page or withholding documents judged to contain too many of these, 
 
 157 Id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 Chinese Audit Documents Remain out of Reach, supra note 3. Press Release,  U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC, Joined by Deloitte China, Files a Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice the Subpoena 
Enforcement Action (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr22911.htm. 
 160 Id. 
 161 See generally Chang, supra note 65. 
 162 Cooperation with Non-U.S. Regulators, PCAOB (last visited Dec. 10, 2014), 
http://pcaobus.org/international/pages/default.aspx. This release discusses the possibility of relying on 
the statements of a foreign regulator to draw conclusions regarding a foreign company’s compliance 
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Id. 
36_3_4_MAITRA FINAL.docx (DO NOT  DELETE) 10/10/16  8:37 PM 
Scaling Two Great Walls 
36:587 (2016) 
611 
rather than treating every request as unenforceable simply because of the 
mere possibility that state secrets might exist in the documents. 
By using the aforementioned rule, the PCAOB can allow the CSRC to 
retain control of the oversight process in China and still fulfill its desired 
goal of compliance with foreign regulatory requirements like Sarbanes-
Oxley. It also fulfills the all-important avoidance of the nightmare scenario 
of a mass delisting or other bans on practicing before foreign regulators. 
This solution may be possible in other countries as well, depending upon 
their jurisdictional requirements and need for authority over the documents. 
Of course, this solution is not a magic bullet. It may not satisfy the 
sensibilities of those on both sides who value the ability to exercise full 
control over these documents and may create further tension if agencies on 
both sides refuse to provide substantial reasons for requesting production of 
sensitive documents or denying those selfsame requests.165 Furthermore, 
there are those who believe in taking a zero-tolerance approach to the issue 
and actually implementing the measures described—the discussion, after 
all, centers around corporate fraud and misinformation, a charged topic and 
grievous crime that is difficult to deal with at the best of times.166 It is 
nonetheless the solution that most effectively preserves Chinese discretion 
and gives foreign governments the access they need to be able to 
successfully prevent and prosecute future instances of financial fraud from 
Chinese companies listed on their jurisdiction’s stock exchanges. As the 
situation 
If a solution acceptable to foreign regulators and to the Chinese 
government is not both found and implemented on a timely basis, it is 
highly likely that cases like the ones detailed above will start to occur more 
frequently. It is only since the SEC’s Initial Decision, in fact, that other 
jurisdictions have begun to levy similar orders for production against the 
Big Four.167 In this situation, it is almost exclusively the largest accounting 
firms—the Big Four—that will suffer litigation costs and potential penalties 
and sanctions in both the foreign jurisdiction and under Chinese law.168 
It is true that the SEC ultimately opted to avoid causing the doomsday 
scenario described in this Note. Its decision, however, has sparked general 
derision in accounting and legal circles, and further violations by Chinese 
companies may cause the SEC—and perhaps other less permissive 
jurisdictions—to reconsider taking no action.169 Moreover, the ubiquity of 
 
 165 See Chang, supra note 65. 
 166 See Phillip Barber, Bull in the China Market: The Gap Between Investor Expectations and 
Auditor Liability for Chinese Financial Statement Frauds, 24 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (2013). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Candice Tewell, ALJ Bars the Big Four’s China Units from SEC Practice for Six Months, DAVIS 
WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP (Apr. 2014), http://www.dwt.com/ALJ-Bars-the-Big-Fours-China-Units-from-
SEC-Practice-for-Six-Months-04-14-2013/. 
 169 Two of the best known accounting blogs, Going Concern and China Accounting Blog, have 
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this problem still sets the stage for this to become the eventual method for 
punishing the auditors. This, in turn, creates a situation in which Chinese 
companies will have fewer options for a crucial type of corporate review 
that is vitally important to both the companies and government.170 If 
Chinese companies cannot use the Big Four as their auditors in outbound 
jurisdictions, their only options will be a series of smaller firms that may 
lack the resources to perform a thorough review of a large client’s periodic 
reports or other financial statements.171 Instead of solving the fraud issue, 
this will only exacerbate the problem. With smaller firms and fewer 
resources for oversight, a company like Longtop or Sino-Forest might 
actually slip under the radar with its financial fraud going unnoticed, and 
companies with healthy balance sheets may be effectively banned from 
being listed overseas.172 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
Currently only two methods exist for dealing with China’s refusal to 
produce accounting information. The first is the approach laid out in the 
SEC’s settlement with the Big 4: an informal approach that allows requests 
to unknown agencies lacking any guarantees of results that can provide a 
foundation for a formal investigation. The second is the approach set forth 
in the Initial Decision, which seeks to hold the accounting firms responsible 
for the standoff and threatens a mass delisting profitable to no one. Both of 
these approaches represent extremes and are wholly impractical going 
forward. In spite of this, however, the U.S. and China have managed to 
informally put one major instance of litigation to rest. Going forward, the 
best solution would be to formalize a process that allows both Chinese and 
foreign regulators to fulfill their obligations, protects investors from market 
fraud, and that provides clear guidelines for disclosure compliance to 
accounting firms and corporations alike. 
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